Most token designs start from a supply chart and look for a reason to exist. This one starts from the settlement loop NeuraMesh is building and asks what a token can honestly do inside it. The answer is three jobs, four borrowed mechanisms and one hard cap minted exactly once, laid out below in full so that it can be criticised before it is frozen.
What NMESH is for
NeuraMesh settles compute. A provider commits GPU capacity, a buyer or an agent reserves it, delivery is metered and verified, and payment is released on evidence. That loop produces three things a token can honestly do: pay for the risk that a provider fails, lock supply behind the right to sell capacity, and give buyers a reason to settle through the protocol rather than around it.
NMESH is designed around those three jobs and nothing else. It is not the unit providers are paid in (they receive USDC), it is not required to use the marketplace, and it carries no claim on NeuraMesh the company. Its value, if any, comes from fees that real settlement generates and from the supply those fees remove or lock.
Supply and allocation
Maximum supply is 1,000,000,000 NMESH: a Move coin (sui::coin), 9 decimals; the full supply is minted once at genesis into labelled escrow and vesting objects and the mint capability is destroyed in the same transaction. Nothing can be minted after that. Every bucket below exists from day one inside an escrow or vesting object, and the two usage-linked buckets (delivery rewards and ecosystem programs) are released only as the usage happens. Delivery rewards that are never earned are burned when their schedule ends.
Share of the 1 billion maximum supply by bucket. Hover or focus a bar for the token count.
| Bucket | Share | Tokens | Who | Terms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Compute delivery rewards | 30 % | 300,000,000 | GPU providers | Held in on-chain escrow and released only against verified, settled GPU-hours. Ten-year declining schedule in five two-year epochs (40 / 25 / 15 / 10 / 10 % of the pool). Rewards not earned by the end of the schedule are burned by the escrow. |
| Ecosystem and buyer programs | 15 % | 150,000,000 | Discount reserve, grants, liquidity programs | Held in on-chain escrow. 10 % is releasable at launch for the compute-discount reserve and initial liquidity programs; the rest becomes releasable linearly over 60 months. Spend is budgeted by governance and capped at 20 % of the bucket in any 12 months. |
| Community launch distribution | 7 % | 70,000,000 | Verified testnet providers, buyers and contributors | Retroactive, sybil-screened distribution to accounts with verified testnet activity. 50 % at launch, 50 % streamed over six months. No task-farming campaign. |
| Treasury and protocol-owned liquidity | 13 % | 130,000,000 | Protocol treasury (on-chain, labelled) | 3 points of the 13 are unlocked at launch to seed market liquidity and the provider backstop. The remainder streams linearly over 48 months. Every treasury wallet is labelled on-chain and reported monthly. |
| Core contributors | 18 % | 180,000,000 | Founding team and early employees | 12-month cliff, then per-second streaming over the following 36 months (48 months total). No acceleration on listing events. |
| Early backers | 12 % | 120,000,000 | Pre-launch investors | 12-month cliff, then per-second streaming over the following 24 months (36 months total). Terms are identical across the round and published before launch. |
| Public launch | 5 % | 50,000,000 | Anyone, same price for everyone | Fair-launch auction at the token generation event; fully unlocked. Proceeds fund protocol-owned liquidity and the backstop, not team wallets. |
Two design choices separate this from a typical launch table. First, the largest bucket belongs to providers and is released from escrow only against verified GPU-hours, so the supply that reaches the market is paid for with delivered compute. Second, insiders hold 30 % between contributors and backers, both behind a one-year cliff with on-chain streaming and no acceleration, which is at the conservative end of comparable networks.
Unlock and release schedule
The curve shows the most NMESH that can be in circulation in each month after launch, counting every vest at full speed and every escrowed bucket released at its ceiling. Real circulation can only be lower, and total supply falls as the burn engine and end-of-schedule escrow burns remove tokens.
Maximum circulating supply as a share of the 1 billion cap. Points mark launch and year boundaries; hover for exact values.
| Point | Month | Max circulating | Tokens | What unlocks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Launch | 0 | 13 % | 130,000,000 | Public auction, half of the community distribution, treasury liquidity seed, first ecosystem budget |
| Year 1 | 12 | 27.7 % | 277,000,000 | Contributor and backer cliffs end; streaming begins |
| Year 2 | 24 | 50.9 % | 509,000,000 | First delivery-reward epoch complete; burn-gated releases start |
| Year 3 | 36 | 71.9 % | 718,500,000 | Backer stream complete |
| Year 4 | 48 | 86.8 % | 868,000,000 | Contributor and treasury streams complete |
| Year 6 | 72 | 94 % | 940,000,000 | Third delivery epoch complete |
| Year 10 | 120 | 100 % | 1,000,000,000 | Final delivery epoch; unreleased delivery rewards are burned |
Net-deflation rule. For the first 24 months the delivery-reward escrow releases its schedule in full against verified GPU-hours. From month 25, only a 25 % floor of each epoch's schedule is released unconditionally; the remaining 75 % is released in proportion to the previous quarter's burn. Releases can never exceed the schedule, and whatever the escrow has not released when the schedule ends is burned, so circulating supply growth falls toward zero as settled volume grows while total supply only ever falls.
The launch float of 13 % is deliberately small but fully explained: it is the public auction, half of the community distribution, the treasury's liquidity seed and the first ecosystem budget. There are no undisclosed over-the-counter allocations and no market-maker loans that return tokens to the treasury off-schedule.
Value accrual: burn, stake, bond
The strongest token models in the market each do one thing well. Ethereum ties scarcity to usage by burning fees. BNB burns on a published formula until a hard floor. Uniswap routes protocol revenue to the people who stake. Solana tapers emissions on a predictable curve. NMESH combines all four, and adds a fifth mechanism that only a compute network can offer: providers must bond tokens to sell capacity.
From the first settled contract, net protocol fees are split 3 ways:
| Fee source | How it is charged |
|---|---|
| Broker commission | Charged on delivered, verified GPU-hours. Pilot target 2 % of the provider rate (see pricing). |
| Trading fees | Charged on executed spot, forward and perpetual-style compute contracts once markets exist. |
| Settlement fees | Flat per-contract fee covering verification, clearing and evidence storage on Walrus. |
Why this is better than any one of the models it borrows from:
- Burn is paid for by compute, not speculation. The buy-and-burn spends fee revenue, so it only accelerates when settled GPU-hours grow. There is no treasury-funded burn theatre.
- Stakers earn revenue, not inflation. The staker share is paid in USDC. A high headline yield cannot be manufactured by printing NMESH.
- Releases are gated by burn. From month 25, 75 % of each epoch's provider rewards leave escrow only in proportion to what the burn removed, so circulating supply cannot outrun usage.
- Bonds lock supply where demand is. Every provider listing capacity bonds NMESH sized to the value committed. Supply grows with the network's capacity, and so does the amount of NMESH that cannot be sold.
- The floor is programmatic. Burning stops at 500,000,000 tokens, exactly half the cap, after which the 40 % burn share flows to stakers. Nobody has to decide when to stop.
Utility for every participant
Each use has its own rules and its own boundary, so a holder voting on policy does not automatically become an insurer, and a buyer's discount does not depend on staking.
| Participant | What NMESH does | How it works |
|---|---|---|
| Buyers | Pay in NMESH for a 6 % discount on eligible compute | Providers are still paid in USDC: NMESH is converted at settlement. The discount is funded from the broker commission and the discount reserve, with per-account monthly caps and anti-abuse checks. |
| Providers | Bond NMESH to list capacity | A listing bond sized to committed capacity (proposed 2 % of its value) is slashed on verified non-delivery, after any USDC collateral. Bonded, high-reputation providers get priority matching and the delivery-reward multiplier. |
| Stakers | Underwrite the provider backstop | Staked NMESH is the last-loss layer behind provider collateral and earns 40 % of net fees in USDC. Lock tiers of 0, 3, 12, 24 months at 1.0, 1.2, 1.6, 2.0 weight both yield and votes. |
| Governance | Set parameters inside published bands | Fee split, discount cap, release floor and listing standards are votable with a 30-day timelock. Max supply, the no-mint rule and the burn floor are immutable. |
The 6 % compute discount is the one utility that already appears across the site and the economics documentation. Its funding comes from the broker commission and the ecosystem bucket's discount reserve, never from new issuance, and it is capped per account and per budget period so it cannot be farmed by self-dealing purchases.
Staking and the provider backstop
Staking in NeuraMesh is underwriting. When a provider fails to deliver a verified contract, the failure waterfall runs in a fixed order, and staked NMESH is the layer before the treasury:
- Buyer refund from escrow
- Provider USDC collateral
- Provider NMESH listing bond
- Staked NMESH backstop (pro rata, capped)
- Treasury reserve, by governance vote
Exposure is bounded: at most 10 % of a staker's position per incident, applied pro rata across the pool. Unstaking has a 14-day unstake cooldown; cooldown positions still cover incidents opened before the request. In exchange, stakers receive 40 % of all net protocol fees in USDC, weighted by lock tier (0, 3, 12, 24 months at 1.0, 1.2, 1.6, 2.0). Longer locks earn more because they underwrite longer-dated capacity contracts.
This is the same real-yield logic as a fee switch, with one honest addition: the yield is compensation for a risk the staker actually carries, which is what makes it sustainable without inflation.
Governance and immutable guarantees
Governance is parameter governance. Staked NMESH votes, with the same lock-tier weights as yield, and every change passes a 30-day timelock during which the parameter and its effective date are shown on this page. Some things are fixed at genesis and cannot be voted on at all:
| Immutable | Guarantee |
|---|---|
| Maximum supply | 1,000,000,000 NMESH minted once at genesis; the mint capability is destroyed in the same transaction |
| Escrowed buckets | Delivery rewards and ecosystem budgets sit in on-chain escrow. What is not released on schedule is burned, never redirected |
| Burn floor | Burning stops at 500,000,000; the burn share then pays stakers |
| Fee switch | Active from the first settled contract; cannot be set to zero for stakers |
| Vesting | Contributor and backer vests are on-chain streams with no admin acceleration |
Everything else moves only inside published bands:
| Parameter | Launch value | Allowed range |
|---|---|---|
| Fee split | 40 / 40 / 20 | Each share may move at most 10 points, 30-day timelock |
| Compute discount | 6 % of eligible subtotal | Range 0–8 %, plus per-account and reserve caps |
| Release floor | 25 % of schedule from month 25 | Range 10–50 % |
| Listing bond | Proposed 2 % of committed capacity value | Range 0.5–5 % |
| Backstop incident cap | 10 % of position | Range 5–20 % |
How it compares
Measured against the models the market already rewards, NMESH is not a new idea in any single column. It is the first design that puts the four proven mechanisms behind one physical unit, the verified GPU-hour, and adds a supply lock that scales with the network's own capacity.
| Token | Model | Supply dynamics | Value capture |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum (ETH) | Burn-and-stake | Dynamic; deflationary when fees exceed issuance | Settlement gas asset, staking yield |
| BNB | Programmatic burn to a floor | Deflationary; quarterly auto-burn to 100 M | Exchange fee discounts, chain gas |
| Uniswap (UNI) | Fee switch | Fixed cap | Protocol revenue to stakers and delegates |
| Solana (SOL) | Tapered disinflation | Declining inflation, partial fee burn | Throughput fees, staking demand |
| NMESH (proposed) | Burn, stake and bond, tied to verified compute | Hard cap 1 B minted once; burn to a 500 M floor; escrowed rewards released only against delivered GPU-hours and gated by burn | Fee switch from day one, listing bonds that lock supply, discount demand from buyers, backstop yield in USDC |
Illustrative economics
These scenarios apply the pilot broker commission from the pricing page to three levels of monthly settled volume at a flat $2 per GPU-hour. They show how fees flow, not what NMESH is worth; they are not forecasts, and they ignore trading and settlement fees entirely.
| Scenario | Settled GPU-hours / month | Net fees / month | Buy-and-burn | To stakers (USDC) | To treasury |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pilot | 100,000 | $4,000 | $1,600 | $1,600 | $800 |
| Regional | 1,000,000 | $40,000 | $16,000 | $16,000 | $8,000 |
| Scale | 10,000,000 | $400,000 | $160,000 | $160,000 | $80,000 |
The point of the table is the shape, not the size: every dollar of fee does three things at once, and two of them (burning and paying stakers) make holding NMESH more attractive exactly when the network is used more. Volume that does not settle through the protocol does none of this, which is why the discount and the listing bond exist.
Launch path to January 2027
- Testnet points and auditsNon-transferable testnet points record verified provider and buyer activity for the community distribution. Coin, escrow, vesting, bond and backstop Move modules go to independent audit. Legal classification opinion obtained for launch jurisdictions.
- Parameters frozen and publishedFinal allocation, vesting streams, fee split and bond sizing are published here and in the docs. Escrow and allocation objects are created and labelled on-chain. Contract addresses appear on the official-links page before anything is tradable.
- Token generation eventGenesis mint into escrow and vesting objects, mint capability destroyed, fair-launch auction on Sui, protocol-owned liquidity seeded, fee switch armed. The date moves if audits or legal review are not complete; the page is updated the same day.
- Burn engine and backstop go liveBuy-and-burn begins with the first settled mainnet contract. The staking backstop opens when the first insured capacity contracts settle. Exchange listings are not promised and never announced anywhere but the official-links page.
The date is a target, not a promise. Audits, legal review and testnet results decide it, and if any of them slip, this page changes before anything else does.
Risks and what is not decided
- Final share sizes may shift by a few points after audit and legal review; the hard cap, the burn floor and the no-mint rule will not.
- The exact funding split of the 6 % discount between broker commission and the reserve, and its caps, are published with the frozen parameters.
- The release-gating formula will be simulated against testnet volume before it is fixed in code.
- Whether early backers exist at all depends on the pre-launch round; if there is no round, that 12 % moves to the treasury under the same 36-month stream.
- Regulatory treatment differs by jurisdiction; the launch may exclude some regions.
Nothing on this page is an offer to sell, a solicitation, investment advice or a prediction of price. NMESH may never launch, and if it does it may be worth nothing. Read the risk disclosure and verify every address on the official links page before interacting with anything that claims to be NMESH.
Questions
Does NMESH exist today?
No. There is no contract, no sale, no airdrop and no listing. This page describes a proposed design with a target launch in January 2027. Until the official-links page shows a contract address, anything calling itself NMESH is a scam.
How will I get NMESH?
Through the public fair-launch auction at the token generation event, by earning delivery rewards as a verified provider, or through the retroactive community distribution if you had verified testnet activity. There is no task-based airdrop campaign.
Will there be an airdrop or presale?
There is a retroactive community distribution for verified testnet activity and a public auction at launch. There is no presale open to the public and no Discord or X-based airdrop. Never send funds to receive tokens.
Why Sui?
Settlement, escrow and evidence commitments for compute contracts are designed as Sui Move objects; the coin lives next to the contracts it pays for, and Walrus stores the receipts.
If everything is minted at genesis, how can supply fall?
Burning. Fee revenue buys NMESH on the market and burns it until the floor, and any delivery rewards the escrow has not released when its ten-year schedule ends are burned too. Nothing can ever be minted again.
Is yield guaranteed?
No. Staking yield is a share of real fees, so it is zero when nothing settles, and stakers carry capped last-loss exposure for provider failures.
Can the team change the rules?
Within published bands and only through a governance vote with a 30-day timelock. Maximum supply, the burn floor and the no-mint rule are fixed at genesis and cannot be voted on.
Only one page announces contracts.
No NMESH contract, sale, airdrop or listing exists today. When one does, its address appears on the official links page first. Anything else is not ours.
Official links →